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Introduction 
America is being roiled by economic and societal dislocations. 
Collapsing middle class wages and wealth—driven by globalization, 
growing market concentration, and fallout from the financial crisis and 
Great Recession—are disrupting politics and social inclusiveness. 
Meanwhile, climate change puts trillions of dollars in public and private 
assets at risk. What role do America’s companies have to play in 
addressing these challenges? 
Some say the question is who do America’s public companies work 
for—shareholders, CEOs and executives, workers, communities, or the 
public—and are the interests of those various stakeholders inherently 
in conflict? Recent decades have been dominated by a managerial 
ideology and practice that says companies work solely for the pecuniary 
interests of shareholders. Management, it is argued, is held accountable 
to shareholders through stock-based compensation, as well as through  
†  Andy Green is managing director of Economic Policy at the Center for 
American Progress. He has served as counsel to Commissioner Kara Stein 
of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and to U.S. Sen. Jeff 
Merkley (D-OR) on the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, where he worked extensively on the Dodd-Frank Act’s 
Volcker rule and on the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act’s 
crowdfunding provisions among other matters. Green holds a B.A. and an 
M.A. from Harvard University and a J.D. from the University of 
California, Hastings College of the Law. This Article is based on a report 
with Andrew Schwartz, policy analyst at the Center for American 
Progress.  
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short-termist hedge funds, high-debt buyout private equity, and the 
broader market for corporate control. Workers, communities, and the 
public have little role in corporate governance as they, fundamentally, 
have interests that are inherently in conflict with shareholders.   
In theory, this attention to shareholders checks management from 
wasting money that shareholders could better spend themselves. Yet 
even under its own logic, it also appears to widely overcorrect, 
inhibiting longer-term investments.1 More troubling, it appears to do 
little to check the outsized growth in executive compensation, while 
also supercharging the pressures on companies to squeeze workers. The 
combined trends are well-represented in the newly disclosed pay ratio 
between CEOs and median workers, which shows extraordinarily high 
ratios of CEO to median worker pay across a wide range of industries.2 
The long-run stagnation of working class wages, and the enormous 
concentration of economic wealth and power at the top, are not simply 
theoretical challenges to social cohesion.3 Their threat to the middle 
class way of life that defines America and its norm-driven approach to 
governance is very real. The return of extraordinary divisive forces in 
America, ones that threaten some of the very foundations of America's 
political order, are inextricably linked to the troubling economic 
outcomes for working Americans.4   
Corporations stand at the center of a wide range of economic 
decision-making in America, with the results being felt by workers and 
society in myriad ways. The troubling economic trends affecting 
workers and inequality are mostly driven by powerful forces external to 
the corporation's decision-making hierarchy, such as globalization more 
than doubling the global labor force, attacks on collective bargaining 
through the regulatory process and in the courts, and weak antitrust 
enforcement. But the company’s internal decision-making priorities—
 
1. Marc Jarsulic et al., Long-termism or Lemons, Ctr. American Progress 
(Oct. 21, 2015), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/ 
2015/10/21/123717/long-termism-or-lemons/ [https://perma.cc/DZ3W-
YK5P].  
2. Diana Hembree, CEO Pay Skyrockets to 361 Times that of the Average 
Worker, Forbes (May 22, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
dianahembree/2018/05/22/ceo-pay-skyrockets-to-361-times-that-of-the-
average-worker/#33bfaa7d776d [https://perma.cc/J3AV-CG22]. 
3. Blueprint for the 21st Century: A Plan for Better Jobs and Stronger 
Communities, Ctr. American Progress (May 14, 2018), https://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/05/14/450856/blueprint
-21st-century/ [https://perma.cc/74RT-XMCZ]. 
4. Neera Tanden, Toward a Marshall Plan for America: Rebuilding Our 
Towns, Cities, and the Middle Class, Ctr. American Progress (May 
16, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/ 
2017/05/16/432499/toward-marshall-plan-america/ [https://perma.cc/ 
E4R6-G66U]. 
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that is, corporate governance—has been a factor. And as such, it has a 
role to play in making the economy work for workers and communities. 
The hopeful news is that there are important trends at work that 
hold the potential for corporate governance to play a more positive role 
in addressing these economic and societal challenges. As the Center for 
American Progress  lays out in Corporate Long-Termism, Trans-
parency, and the Public Interest,5 on which this Article is based, the 
rise of long-term investors whose interests align more with those of 
workers, the environment, and communities opens the possibility for 
moving management and companies to act in ways that benefit all of 
these groups. Yet the shared interests of longer-term investors, workers, 
and the broader public in good jobs, a clean environment, and 
productivity-enhancing economic growth are stymied today by 
insufficient transparency and accountability in public (and, in-
creasingly, private) company corporate governance.6 
Regulators, in particular the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC), need to catch up. In particular, shareholders and stakeholders 
need far more robust disclosure of environmental, social, and 
governance (ESG) information in a consistent, comparable, and reliable 
manner.7 In addition, shareholders and stakeholders need enhanced 
tools to hold management accountable with respect to these long-
termism-related matters. 
Improved ESG disclosure and accountability is not just good for 
the public; it is good for shareholders. Some of the most under-
 
5. Andy Green & Andrew Schwartz, Corporate Long-Termism, 
Transparency, and the Public Interest, Center for American 
Progress (Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ 
economy/reports/2018/10/02/458891/corporate-long-termism-transparency-
public-interest/ [https://perma.cc/7XLR-HNTQ]. 
6. Id. 
7. See, e.g., letter from SEC Investor Advisory Committee to the Div. of 
Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (June 15, 2016), https://www. 
sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-22.pdf [https://perma.cc/8K4E-3EYK]; 
Tyler Gellasch, Towards a Sustainable Economy: A Review of Comments 
to the SEC’s Disclosure Effectiveness Concept Release, Pub. Citizen 
(Sept. 16, 2016), https://www.citizen.org/sites/default/files/sustainable 
economyreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/7LS4-ZDTQ]; letter from Ceres to 
Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-174.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
PW9X-JXL5]; letter from Int’l Corp. Accountability Roundtable to Mary 
Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n (July 19, 2016), https:// 
www.sec.gov/comments/s7-06-16/s70616-161.pdf [https://perma.cc/4WKN- 
KR5X]; Lisa Gilbert & Rachel Curley, The Historic Campaign for 
Corporate Political Spending Disclosure, Pub. Citizen (Sept. 14, 
2016), https://corporatereformcoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/ 
Corporate-Political-Spending-Disclosure-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/68SJ- 
PBC3]. 
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appreciated systemic vulnerabilities of the U.S. financial system—and 
hence U.S. economic growth—lay in correlated yet hidden risks, some 
of which improved ESG disclosure can help unmask.8 Quality corporate 
disclosure may also be increasingly important to defending the public 
and the economy from the growing threat of misinformation. 
It is unsurprising then that investors overwhelmingly demand 
expanded disclosure.9 Indeed, ESG matters are squarely material to 
market performance, in particular risk management, with the perceived 
trade-off between performance and social responsibility no longer 
relevant.10 
Markets cannot do this by themselves. Decades of self-help by 
investors and stakeholders has made some, but insufficient, progress. 
Sustainability reports are more prevalent than ever, private standard-
setters have pioneered new models for disclosure, and long-term 
investors engage with companies more than ever.11 Yet investors lack 
access to complete, consistent, high-quality, and verified ESG 
information.12 
Corporate long-termism is not a panacea to the world’s problems. 
Yet disclosure and accountability can better align investors, managers, 
and other stakeholders for positive long-term results for all. This Article 
summarizes some of the arguments for (and against) boosting long-
termism, focusing on ESG information and case studies on worker 
training and climate change. The same approach applies to many other 
ESG matters. 
The Article also summarizes several recommendations for how the 
SEC, under its own mandate or as directed by a new Congress, make 
progress. As laid out in the Center for American Progress report, the 
 
8. See, e.g., Robert J. Schiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral 
Finance, 17 J. Econ. Persps. 83, 83–104 (2003), http://www.econ.yale. 
edu/~shiller/pubs/p1055.pdf [https://perma.cc/8NHW-E7KB]; Mark Carney, 
Gov., Bank of Eng., Chairman, Fin. Stability Bd., Speech at Lloyd’s of 
London, Breaking the Tragedy of the Horizon—Climate Change and 
Financial Stability, (Sept. 29, 2015), https://www.bis.org/review/r151009a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GBN3-82Z4]. 
9. Gellasch, supra note 7, at 7. 
10. Sustainable Value: Communicating ESG to the 21st Century 
Investor, Morgan Stanley Inst. for Sustainable Investing 
http://www.morganstanley.com/auth/content/dam/msdotcom/ideas/ 
investor-relations/1910712-Sustainable-Value-Communicating-ESG.pdf 
[https:// perma.cc/VL5L-VT9F] (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
11. 81% of S&P 500 Companies Published Corporate Sustainability Reports 
in 2015, Governance and Accountability Inst. Inc., http://www.ga- 
institute.com/nc/issue-master-system/news-details/article/flash-report-
eighty-one-percent-81-of-the-sp-500-index-companies-published-corporate- 
sustainabi.html [https://perma.cc/ZZN7-VM57] (last visited Mar. 24, 2019). 
12. See, e.g., Gellasch, supra note 7, at 7–8. 
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SEC and relevant policymakers should: directly mandate high quality, 
consistent ESG disclosure; look to external organizations for ESG 
disclosure standards; defend an investor-oriented, public-interest 
approach to disclosure, especially on questions of materiality; boost 
audit standards; bring enforcement actions and protect the rights of 
states and private investors; enhance board ESG expertise and focus on 
long-termism; and maintain the shareholder voice in favor of ESG and 
long-termism.13 
I. Why ESG and Corporate Long-Termism? 
American public companies matter greatly to the U.S. economy. 
They employ millions of people, help drive productivity growth, and 
offer many of the goods and services in the economy.14 So how they 
perform matters a lot for how the economy evolves. 
Indeed, the very premise of the capital market is that it will allocate 
investments to the best economic uses. Of course, we know markets are 
imperfect. But the most basic protection against market imperfection 
is information. Today, ESG information is far too lacking, making it 
challenging for markets to effectively allocate capital in ways that make 
sense over the long term. 
Take, for example, worker training and climate change. Between 
2001 and 2009, employers cut their training by more than 27 percent.15 
Yet this cut is not in line with the long-term interests of workers, the 
economy, or even the company. Many studies confirm that on-the-job 
training boosts productivity for workers, firms, and the entire 
economy.16 
 
13. Andy Green & Andrew Schwartz, Corporate Long-Termism, 
Transparency, and the Public Interest, Ctr. for Am. Progress (Oct. 
2, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/ 
reports/2018/10/02/458891/corporate-long-termism-transparency-public-
interest/ [https://perma.cc/MYV4-8ZG2]. 
14. See William Lazonick, Profits Without Prosperity: How Stock Buybacks 
Manipulate the Market, and Leave Most Americans Worse Off, Ann. 
Conf. of the Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Apr. 2014, at 2–3, 
https://www.ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/LAZONICK_William_
Profits-without-Prosperity-20140406.pdf [https://perma.cc/US5P-DJYK]. 
15. Angela Hanks et al., Workers or Waste? How Companies Disclose—Or 
Do Not Disclose—Human Capital Investments and What to Do About It, 
Ctr. for Am. Progress 5–6 (June 2016), https://cdn.americanprogress. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/03042031/HumanCapital.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/HVH6-KNWU]. 
16. Id. at 3–4; see Lawrence H. Summers & Ed Balls, Report of the 
Commission on Inclusive Prosperity, Ctr. for Am. Progress 15, 30, 
81–82 (Jan. 2015), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2015/01/IPC-PDF-full.pdf [https://perma.cc/7X2L-FNFT]. 
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Short-termist cost pressures are one of a number of reasons why 
companies reduce workforce training investment.17 But financial 
markets also play a role. Worker training investments are grouped into 
other general and administrative expenses, which means companies that 
make those investments look more wasteful than others. A rather 
modest fix of worker training disclosure, modeled on how research and 
development (R&D) is disclosed, could help undue this perverse 
incentive. And indeed, unlike workforce training, R&D has risen in U.S. 
companies.18 
Climate change offers an even larger-scale example of why greater 
ESG disclosure is essential for risk management and effective capital 
allocation.19 From energy sector asset valuation to the risks that 
extreme weather poses to crops, coastal property, and supply chains,20 
climate change poses a direct and indeed systemic threat to the 
economy and society. Without sufficient, comparable, and reliable 
assessments of what this means to individual companies and to the 
entire market, investors and the public are left in the dark,21 and capital 
markets cannot do their most basic job. 
Ultimately, from political spending to human rights, tax strategies 
to cybersecurity risks, ESG covers a wide range of matters that are 
increasingly essential for how companies maintain and enhance their 
performance and manage their risks.22 The old notion that an ESG focus 
 
17. Hanks et al., supra note 15, at 7, 13–14, 18; Summers & Balls, supra note 
16, at 86. 
18. Kathleen M. Kahle & René M. Stulz, Is the U.S. Public Corporation in 
Trouble?, 1 (European Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper 
No. 495/2017, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
2869301 [https://perma.cc/7C2E-Y7L3]. 
19. Task Force on Climate-Related Fin. Disclosures, Fin. Stability 
Bd., Recommendations of the Task Force on Climate-related 
Financial Disclosures 5–10 (2017), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2017/06/FINAL-TCFD-Report-062817.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
GCX8-FL8Q]. 
20. Id. at 5–6. 
21. Task Force on Climate-Related Fin. Disclosures, Fin. Stability 
Bd., Phase I Report of the Task Force on Climate-Related 
Financial Disclosures 3 (2016), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/03/Phase_I_Report_v15.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSN4-
W4M7]. 
22. See, e.g., Usman Hayat & Matt Orsagh, Environmental, Social, 
and Governance Issues in Investing: A Guide for Investment 
Professionals, CFA Inst. 1, 6–7 (2009), https://www.cfapubs.org/ 
doi/pdf/10.2469/ccb.v2015.n11.1 [https://perma.cc/N7V8-BGDT]; see also 
Gellasch, supra note 7, at 7, 23; SASB Conceptual Framework, 
Sustainability Accounting Standards Bd. 1, 3–5, 17 (2017), https:// 
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and investor returns were inversely correlated is increasingly history. 
And indeed, academic research confirms that ESG information is 
important for long-term investment success and in particular the 
management of risk. In particular, one survey of 2,000 other academic 
studies highlights the correlation between ESG criteria and corporate 
financial performance.23 Lower costs of capital and other benefits to 
companies and investors are also being shown to arise from considering 
ESG factors in decision-making.24 
Yet far too little is being disclosed, precisely as the demand for this 
information has reached extraordinary levels. As of the latest available 
data, ESG-focused investing accounts for more than $8.72 trillion in 
total assets under management—making it no longer a niche 
investment category.25 Moreover, 82 percent of mainstream, or non-ESG 
focused, investors consider ESG information when making investment 
decisions.26 The dramatic growth in investor support for the United  
www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/SASB-Conceptual-Framework. 
pdf [https://perma.cc/9SUR-Y49R]. 
23. Gunnar Friede et al., ESG and Financial Performance: Aggregated 
Evidence from More than 2000 Empirical Studies, 5 J. Sustainable Fin. 
& Inv. 210, 210, 225 (2015); Mark Fulton et al., Sustainable 
Investing: Establishing Long-Term Value and Performance, 
Deutsche Bank 1, 21, 68, 71 (2012), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2222740 [https://perma.cc/s9JE-K77Y]; Mercer, 
Shedding Light on Responsible Investment: Approaches, Returns 
and Impacts 1, 1–2 (2009), http://www.sustainablefinance.ch/upload/ 
cms/user/Shedding_light_on_responsible_investment_free_version.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/NE9Q-F8XW]; Michael Lee-Chin Family, Inst. 
for Corp. Citizenship, Academic Literature on ESG and 
Financial Performance: Preliminary Literature Search, Rotman 
1, 1–2 (2016), https://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/-/media/Files/Programs-
and-Areas/lee-Chin_Institute/LCI-Brief---Academic-Literature-on-ESG-
and-Financial-Performance-2016.pdf?la=en [https://perma.cc/Z5X9-BHRZ]. 
24. Fulton et al., supra note 23, at 5, 7, 28, 70; Robert G. Eccles, Ioannis 
Ioannou & George Serafeim, The Impact of Corporate Sustainability on 
Corporate Behavior and Performance, Nat’l Bureau Econ. Res. 1, 1, 
17–20 (2012), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17950 [https://perma.cc/ 
Z4HS-Q9QJ]; see also Amir Amel-Zadeh & George Serafeim, Why and 
How Investors Use ESG Information: Evidence from a Global Survey 1, 
2–4 (July 1, 2017) (unpublished), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers. 
cfm?abstract_id=2925310 [https://perma.cc/3JFG-LRLS]; Hiroshi Miyai 
& Yasuyuki Sugiura, Environmental, Social, and Governance Investment 
and Material Disclosure by Companies 1, 1–4 (Jan. 24, 2018) 
(unpublished), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3109050 [https://perma.cc/PT7P-XNH3]. 
25. U.S. SIF, Report on US Sustainable, Responsible and Impact 
Investing Trends 1, 5 (2016), https://www.ussif.org/files/SIF_Trends_ 
16_Executive_Summary(1).pdf [https://perma.cc/7LYM-9BAZ]. 
26. Amel-Zadeh & Serafeim, supra note 24, at 4, 12; Emiel van Duuren, Auke 
Plantinga & Bert Scholtens, ESG Integration and the Investment 
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Nations Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) is also striking. 
Since 2006, it has grown from 100 members to more than 1,800 
signatories managing more than $80 trillion in assets.27 Investor 
attention to ESG is, quite simply, where the market is today and is 
going in the future. 
So have the disclosure rules kept up? As the section below shows, 
the answer is no. And the cost of this failure falls on the backs of those 
who would benefit from the improved alignment of interests that ESG 
disclosure and accountability offers: long-term investors, workers and 
communities, and the broader public interest.28 
II. The Market and Regulators Fail 
Investor and public demand for ESG information is not new. Fifty 
years ago, shareholders and public interest groups demanded the SEC 
require environmental disclosures and disclosures regarding equal 
employment opportunities.29 The SEC responded with some 
environmental disclosure obligations, but less than hoped for.30  
More recently, investors and the public have pressed the SEC to 
revamp its corporate disclosure framework with enhanced ESG 
disclosures, especially on political spending31 and climate change.32 More 
than 1.2 million commenters individually weighed in with the SEC on 
political spending alone.33 Yet, the SEC has remained frozen, unable or 
unwilling to move forward. 
The only thing it was able to do was guidance that simply repeats 
current requirements for disclosing all material information relevant to 
 
Management Process: Fundamental Investing Reinvented, 138 J. Bus. 
Ethics 525, 527, 530, 532 (2016). 
27. About the PRI, Principles for Resp. Inv., https://www.unpri.org/about 
[https://perma.cc/XCR9-WJ8K] (last visited Mar. 8, 2019); Circularity 
Capital Joins Un-Supported Principles for Responsible Investment, 
Circularity Cap. (Nov. 28, 2017), https://circularitycapital.com/news/ 
2017/12/1/circularity-capital-joins-un-supported-principles-for-responsible-
investment [https://perma.cc/AV2G-U3ZZ]. 
28. See infra Part II. 
29. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 606 F.2d 1031, 1031, 
1035–36 (D.C. Cir. 1979); see also Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities 
and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 Harv. 
L. Rev 1197, 1199–1207, 1246–50 (1999).  
30. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 606 F.2d at 1036–42. 
31. Gellasch, supra note 7, at 5, 22. 
32. Cal. Pub. Emps’ Ret. Sys. et al., Petition for Interpretative Guidance on 
Climate Risk Disclosure (Sept. 17, 2007).  
33. Gilbert & Curley, supra note 7, at 3.  
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climate change impacts,34 and even that proved short-lived in its 
impact. Public and private studies of the climate guidance’s impact 
highlight its limited durability.35 
In contrast, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 mandated a number of new ESG disclosures, 
specifically the pay ratio comparing the CEO’s annual total com-
pensation to employees’ median annual total compensation, conflict 
minerals disclosures, mine safety disclosures, and resource extraction 
payments disclosures.36 More recently, Congress mandated disclosure of 
Iran-related business activities.37 
Many of these mandates are under attack, either at the SEC or in 
the courts.38 And while some were both too prescriptive and 
insufficiently broad, they nevertheless advanced meaningful 
transparency for investors on ESG matters. 
Separately, private efforts to advance transparency have made 
meaningful progress. More and more investors engage companies 
directly, put forth proposals under the SEC’s Rule 14a-8 (which enables 
shareholders to vote on certain topics),39 or seek change on boards of 
directors. The rise of ESG-focused funds, driven in part by the views of 
 
34. Climate Change, Release Nos. 33-9106; 34-6149, 17 C.F.R §§ 211, 231, 
241 (Feb. 8, 2010).  
35. Jim Coburn & Jackie Cook, Cool Response: The SEC & Corporate 
Climate Change Report, Ceres 4–6 (2014), https://www.ourenergypolicy. 
org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Ceres_SECguidance-append_020414_ 
web.pdf [perma.cc/866X-UHD9]; U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, 
GAO-18-188, Climate-Related Risks: SEC Has Taken Steps to 
Clarify Disclosure Requirements 15 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/ 
assets/700/690197.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJP3-TY3E] [hereinafter Climate- 
Related Risks]. 
36. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 
No. 111-203, §§ 953(b), 1502–04, 124 Stat. 1376, 1904, 2213–22 (July 21, 
2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5301). 
37. See Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 
No. 112-158, 126 Stat. 1214 (Aug. 10, 2012); see also U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Notice required by the Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act of 2012 to be filed through EDGAR 
(2012), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cfannouncements/itr-act2012. 
htm [https://perma.cc/GV7D-M6NN]. 
38. See, e.g., Dan Gallagher, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement 
at SEC Meeting: Proposed Rule to Implement Section 1502 of the Dodd-
Frank Act—the ‘Conflict Minerals’ Provision, https://www.sec.gov/news/ 
public-statement/2012-08-22-open-meeting-statement-dmg [https://perma. 
cc/7W6U-2Z48]. 
39. J. Robert Brown Jr., Corporate Governance, Shareholder Proposals, and 
Engagement Between Managers and Owners, 2017 Denv. L. Rev. 
(Special Issue) 300 (2017). 
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millennial investors, also mean that investors are voting with their 
feet.40 
Thanks to the work of United Nations Principles for Reasonable 
Investing, many stock exchanges, including the London Stock 
Exchange, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ, have 
successively adopted new voluntary standards for ESG disclosure.41 
Internationally, the European Union has pushed forward its EU 
Directive 2014/95/EU, which sets ESG reporting requirements for large 
public companies.42 
Sustainability reporting has also taken off, with more than 85 
percent of public companies now providing these ESG-focused reports.43 
Yet, despite the helpful work of private standard setters, the lack of 
uniformity, detail, completeness, and reliability are problems.44 Indeed, 
 
40. CalPERS & CALSTRS, The Importance of Corporate 
Engagement of Climate Change, https://www.calpers.ca.gov/docs/ 
corporate-engagement-climate-change.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A2U-LZX7] 
(last visited May 8, 2019). 
41. SSE Campaign to Close the ESG Guidance Gap, Sustainable Stock 
Exchanges Initiative, http://www.sseinitiative.org/esg-guidance/ [https:// 
perma.cc/R6R7-PQ9B] (last visited May 8, 2019); see also Danielle 
Chesebrough et al., Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative, 
2016 Report on Progress, (2016), http://www.sseinitiative.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/SSE-Report-on-Progress-2016.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/V8EM-SEHC]; Exchange Guidance & Recommendation–October 2015, 
World Fed’n Exchanges, http://www.sseinitiative.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2015/11/WFE-ESG-Recommendation-Guidance-Oct-2015.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D6GG-V2AQ]; Investor Listing Standard Proposals: 
Recommendations for Stock Exchange Requirements on Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting, Ceres (Mar. 26, 2014), https://www.ceres. 
org/resources/reports/investor-listing-standards-proposal [https://perma. 
cc/BP2Z-LLNZ]. 
42. Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
22 October 2014 amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure 
of non-financial and diversity information by certain large undertakings 
and groups Text with EEA relevance, EUR-Lex, http://eur-lex. 
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32014L0095 [https:// 
perma.cc/PNR2-FZ7L] (last visited May 8, 2019). 
43. 85% of the S&P 500 Index Companies Publish Sustainability Reports in 
2017, Governance & Accountability Inst. Inc. (2018), https://www. 
ga-institute.com/press-releases/article/flash-report-82-of-the-sp-500-
companies-published-corporate-sustainability-reports-in-2016.html [https:// 
perma.cc/6UEM-D9DG]. 
44. Erst & Young With Boston College Center for Corporate 
Citizenship, Value of sustainability reporting 4 (2013), http:// 
www.confluencellc.com/uploads/3/7/9/6/37965831/valueofsustainability
summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/T96S-2FEM]; Donato Calace, The Battle 
Continues: GRI vs SASB vs IR, GreenBiz (Mar. 15, 2016), https:// 
www.greenbiz.com/article/battle-continues-gri-vs-sasb-vs-ir [https://perma. 
cc/X8CC-T5GK]; Eric J. Hespenheide & Dinah A. Koehler, Deloitte 
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sustainability reporting still looks more like public relations documents 
than rigorous disclosure documents.45 Still, the wide prevalence of 
sustainability reports show that companies can and do believe that 
investors want and need this information, and that they can and do 
provide some of it. 
Recently, investors, market participants, and public interest 
reformers have pressed to enhance disclosed through existing 
mandatory regulatory reporting channels. The most important of these 
is the work of the Sustainability Accounting Standards Board (SASB), 
which argues that U.S. securities laws already require mandatory 
reporting that companies, owing to lack of standardization, simply have 
not effectively met. To answer that market failure, SASB has issued 
detailed standards for nearly eighty sectors regarding what information 
public companies should be reporting in their SEC regulatory filings.46 
The approach has a number of advantages, including its ability to 
leverage input from issuers, investors, academics, and other experts in 
the standard-setting process. But, pressing all companies to fully utilize 
the standards will require more than persuasion. 
Even though litigation takes years and has yet to bear fruit, state 
attorneys general and private litigants have an important role to play 
in advancing companies’ ESG disclosures.47 The leading case remains 
that of the New York State Attorney General, who began, in 2007, 
tackling questions of fraud around climate change disclosure by publicly 
listed oil companies.48 
 
Univ. Press, Disclosure of Long-Term Business Value (2013), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/disclosure-
of-long-term-business-value/DUP150_Reporting_What_Matters.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AEW6-EVGM]. 
45. See John K. Lewis, Corporate Social Responsibility/Sustainability 
Reporting Among the Fortune 250: Greenwashing or Green Supply 
Chain?, Salve Regina U., Winter I 2015, at5]; Olivier Boiral, 
Sustainability Reports as Simulacra? A Counter-Account of A and A+ 
GRI Reports, 26 Acct., Auditing & Accountability J. 1036 (2013). 
46. SASB Conceptual Framework, supra note 22. 
47. Climate Change, Release Nos. 33-9106; 34-6149, 17 C.F.R §§ 211, 231, 
241 (Feb. 8, 2010). 
48. Felicity Barringer & Danny Hakim, New York Subpoenas 5 Energy 
Companies, N.Y. Times (Sept. 16, 2007), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2007/09/16/nyregion/16greenhouse.html [https://perma.cc/DZ4D-CYT3]; 
Chris Mooney & Dino Grandoni, New York City Sues Shell, ExxonMobil 
and Other Oil Companies over Climate Change, Wash. Post (Jan. 10, 
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/ 
2018/01/10/new-york-city-sues-shell-exxonmobil-and-other-oil-majors-over- 
climate-change/?utm_term=.a6fe4a6de9aa [https://perma.cc/Q7X8-9X72]. 
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III. Paths Forward 
Addressing investors’ and the public’s urgent need for information 
on public companies’ ESG performance will require action by the SEC 
or, in its absence, by Congress. Here are a number of steps that the 
SEC should take. 
First, the SEC should set forth specific disclosure requirements 
applicable to all corporate filers. Some of the topics that ought to be 
considered include human capital matters; climate risks and impacts; 
human rights risks; political spending; and tax strategies and risks.49 
Comments to the SEC’s 2016 Concept Release on Regulation S-K, 
together with the efforts of other disclosure platforms, such as GRI and 
SASB, offer reasonable indicia regarding what disclosures investors are 
demanding and how to go about meeting that demand in detail.50 
Analysis and investor testing by SEC offices, such as the Division of 
Economic and Risk Analysis and the Office of Investor Advocate, will 
also be essential to ensuring disclosures adequately meet investor 
demand. 
The SEC should also offer industry-specific guidance as well as 
review and comment on specific, industry-leading companies as means 
to move the market quickly. As the experience with the SEC’s 2010 
climate guidance shows, however, general guidance and comment letters 
are not enough.51 A catch-all mandate for ESG disclosure would also be 
a useful way to encourage companies to begin offering more disclosure, 
as well as offer a flexible backstop to specific requirements.52 
In addition, given the continuing growth of private markets and its 
impacts on investors and markets, the SEC should move towards 
expanding ESG disclosure mandates to cover private companies of a 
certain size, scope, or number of shareholders.53 
Second, an alternative or additional approach would be for the SEC 
to look to an external organization for the detailed expertise that may 
 
49. Gellasch, supra note 7, at 21–23. 
50. Id. at 8–9. 
51. Coburn & Cook, supra note 35, at 4–5; Climate-Related Risks, supra 
note 35, at 15. 
52. Comment Letter from J. Robert Brown, Jr., Professor, Univ. Of Denver, 
to Brent Fields, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, on Concept Release on 
Disclosure Effectiveness (Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/comments/ 
s7-06-16/s70616-374.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WSK-Q6FC]; see also Jill E. 
Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 Geo. L. J. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 29, 35–36), https://ssrn.com/abstract= 
3233053 [https://perma.cc/XNT4-TTCX] (exploring a new “sustainability 
discussion and analysis” mandate). 
53. See Elisabeth De Fontenay, The Deregulation of Private Capital and the 
Decline of the Public Company, 68 Hastings L.J. 445, 449 (2017). 
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be required in setting specific ESG disclosures, especially those that 
vary by industry. For example, mandates for political spending and tax 
strategies may be best established by the SEC via line-item mandates, 
but climate change risk or human rights risks may be best considered 
on an industry-by-industry basis. Given that they may require detailed 
knowledge that the SEC may not be well-positioned to provide, relying 
on those that have established a transparent, investor-friendly process 
would make sense. Nor is this a new approach at the SEC, which has a 
long tradition of using self-regulatory organizations and other external 
organizations to set rules for and oversee particular aspects of the 
securities markets.54 Over time, industry capture remains a serious risk 
at any organization, and the SEC should remain attentive to issues such 
as transparency, membership and participation, governance, and 
funding.55 
Regardless of which entity sets disclosure requirements, it is 
particular important that a strongly investor-friendly approach to 
materiality be maintained. Some ESG matters are often asserted to not 
be material, owing to the small amount of money that can be involved. 
Take political spending, where investors have been winning numerous 
shareholder proposals, 56 yet the item is frequently critiqued as not being 
material on numerical grounds. But the SEC has “long recognized that 
investors may well have an interest in matters beyond the issue’s direct 
relevance to the company’s profits and losses.”57 It is not for  
54. See Securities Act of 1933 § 19(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77s(d)(4) (2018); Corporate 
Accounting Practices: Is There a Credibility GAAP? Hearings Before the 
H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., Comm. 
on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. 51 (2002) (testimony by Robert K. Herdman, 
Chief Accountant, U.S. Securities & Exchange Commission); Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 108, 15 U.S.C. 7218(b) (2018). 
55. Karthik Ramanna, Political Standards: Corporate Interest, 
Ideology, and Leadership in the Shaping of Accounting Rules 
for the Market Economy 7–8 (2015); see Sustainable Accounting 
Standards Board, SASB Rules of Procedure 4–5 (2017), https:// 
www.sasb.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/SASB-Rules-of-Procedure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ZTJ7-CSKU]. 
56. Gilbert & Curley, supra note 7, at 4–9; see also Comments on Rulemaking 
Petition: Petition to Require Public Companies to Disclose to 
Shareholders the Use of Corporate Resources for Political Activities, U.S. 
Sec. & Exchange Comm’n (June 20, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/ 
comments/4-637/4-637.shtml [https://perma.cc/NE5U-QTYP]; Robert 
Yablon, Campaign Finance Reform Without Law, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 185, 
211–12 (2017). 
57. Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Responding to Objections 
to Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending (1): The Claim of 
Immateriality, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. 
(Apr. 4, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/04/04/responding-
to-objections-to-shining-light-on-corporate-political-spending-1-the-claim-
of-immateriality/ [https://perma.cc/8T6V-K4AB] [hereinafter Bebchuk 
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management to substitute its determinations of materiality for that of 
regulators, acting on behalf of investors.58 
Additionally, an unfortunate trend has been afoot to twist 
materiality from a general disclosure principle and a defense in an 
enforcement context to something that management would have to 
affirmatively find before a disclosure mandates attaches.59 Through the 
Management, Discussion and Analysis section, management has its 
opportunity to indicate what it believes to be important. The 
materiality standard, though, is about whether disclosure is important 
to investors.60 An affirmative finding requirement shifts the burden too 
much in favor of management discretion and against disclosure. 
Third, the SEC should enhance audit standards for ESG 
information, which are less demanding than those for financial 
information.61 This could also entail pushing audit committees to 
 
& Jackson, Responding to Objections]; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. 
Jackson, Jr., Shining Light on Corporate Political Spending, 101 Geo. L. 
J. 923, 943 (2013) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Jackson, Shining Light]. 
58. Bebchuk & Jackson, Responding to Objections, supra note 57; Bebchuk 
& Jackson, Shining Light, supra note 57, at 947–49. 
59. See, e.g., Press Release, Fin. Accounting Standards Bd., FASB Proposals 
Improvements to Materiality to Make Financial Statement Disclosures 
More Effective (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.fasb.org/cs/ContentServer?c= 
FASBContent_C&pagename=FASB%2FFASBContent_C%2FNewsPage& 
cid=1176166401832 [https://perma.cc/YB9Q-F6L4]; SEC Inv’r Advisory 
Comm., Comment Letter on Proposed Amendments to Statement of 
Financial Accounting Concepts and Notes to Financial Statements (Jan. 
21, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-
2012/iac-letter-fasb-materiality-012116.pdf [https://perma.cc/HR5Y-T7E2]; 
see SEC Investor Advisory Comm., Minutes of the Meeting on October 
15, 2015, U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/ 
spotlight/investor-advisory-committee-2012/iac101515-minutes.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/YED4-6EBH] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019); SEC Investor 
Advisory Comm., Minutes of the Meeting on January 21, 2016, U.S. 
Securities & Exchange Comm’n, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/ 
investor-advisory-committee-2012/iac012116-minutes.html [https://perma. 
cc/7DPL-ERF5] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019). 
60. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(c)(1) 
(2018); Exchange Act Rule, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2018); TSC Indus. 
Inv. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976); see also SEC Staff 
Accounting Bulletin No. 99, 17 C.F.R. § 211 (Aug. 12, 1999), https:// 
www.sec.gov/interps/account/sab99.htm [https://perma.cc/G3ZA-PXHC] 
(finding that information is material and must be disclosed to investors 
through the financial statements it files with the SEC “if there is a 
substantial likelihood that a reasonable person would consider it 
important”). 
61. Coburn & Cook, supra note 35, at 7; Climate-Related Risks, supra 
note 35, at 7–8; see Attestation, Public Comp. Accounting Oversight 
Bd., https://pcaobus.org/Standards/Attestation/Pages/default.aspx 
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engage in the same level of oversight for ESG matters as for that of 
ordinary financial information. 
Fourth, enforcement needs to be part and parcel of any strategy to 
make ESG disclosure effective and reliable. Unless the SEC and state 
attorneys general brings cases that help establish these broader 
precedents, it will difficult for investors as plaintiffs to secure their 
rights to this information. Of course, protecting the rights of investors 
to secure their rights in court will be essential in retaining robust and 
accountable capital markets.62 
Fifth, policymakers should push corporations to ensure their boards 
have greater ESG expertise and focus, as well as accountability to long-
termism generally. Membership, culture, and incentives for boards have 
an important role in oversight of management and in setting the 
broader direction for the company.63 Indeed, investors have recently 
called for greater board diversity, which the SEC and others could build 
upon by including ESG expertise within the definition of diversity of 
membership.64 Board attention to ESG could also be enhanced through 
a disclosure that explained how the board was incorporating the views 
of workers, communities, and other major stakeholders in the 
corporation’s governance, as well as how it is achieving its long-term-
oriented goals. 
 
[https://perma.cc/82GR-ERG5] (last visited Mar. 11, 2019) (describing 
the attestation standards adopted by PCAOB). 
62. Andy Green, Could the SEC Secretly Abolish Investors’ Right to Sue?, 
MarketWatch (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/ 
could-the-sec-secretly-abolish-investors-right-to-sue-2018-03-02 [https:// 
perma.cc/P5YR-5G6].  
63. Colin Mayer, Reinventing the Corporation, J. Brit. Acad. 4, 53–77 
(2016); see also Martin Lipton, The New Paradigm, Harv. L. Sch. F. 
on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. (Jan. 11, 2017), https://corpgov. 
law.harvard.edu/2017/01/11/corporate-governance-the-new-paradigm/ 
[https://perma.cc/XWS6-HU8S]; see also About the Investor Stewardship 
Group and the Framework for U.S. Stewardship and Governance, Inv. 
Stewardship Group, https://isgframework.org/ [https://perma.cc/D2PG- 
V4SH] (last visited Mar. 22, 2019). For an alternative view of corporate 
governance but one that reaches largely the same conclusions regarding 
the importance of boards of directors for corporate performance, see, e.g., 
Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access 
Debate, 65 Bus. Law. 329 (Feb. 2010). 
64. Letter from Anne Simpson et al., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Inv’r Advisory 
Comm., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 31, 
2015), https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2015/petn4-682.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/F8KL-ZKWW]; see Cybersecurity Disclosure Act of 2017, S. 
536, 115th Cong. (2017); see also Press Release, Office of Sen. Elizabeth 
Warren, Warren Introduces Accountable Capitalism Act, (Aug. 15, 2018), 
https://www.warren.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/warren-introduces- 
accountable-capitalism-act [https://perma.cc/P5GY-9TN2]. 
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Sixth, and finally, shareholder voice has an important role to play 
in promoting ESG disclosure and corporate long-termism generally.65 
Indeed, shareholders bear the primary risks from insufficient ESG 
disclosure. To that end, shareholders must retain full access to 
shareholder proposals and to the independent governance advice of their 
choosing.66 
In addition, with retail ownership of stocks overwhelmingly med-
iated by asset managers,67 as well as millions of working Americans 
invested in 401(k)s or a pension fund for the long run, how their asset 
managers approach ESG is more important than ever.68 Asset managers 
are fiduciaries and well positioned to take the longer-term view. That, 
however, can vary greatly in approach—with some asset managers 
increasingly focused on ESG-oriented matters, 69 while others do not 
engage or simply follow management for important shareholder votes.70 
 
65. See, e.g., Kara Stein, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at 
Standford University: Mutualism: Reimagining the Role of Shareholders 
in Modern Corporate Governance, (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/ 
news/speech/speech-stein-021318 [https://perma.cc/EJ2Q-SJ3T]; Hester 
M. Peirce, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks at the 17th 
Annual SEC Conference, Center for Corporate Reporting and 
Governance: My Beef with Stakeholders (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www. 
sec.gov/news/speech/speech-peirce-092118 [https://perma.cc/TZ2A-TFV6]. 
66. See Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder 
Democracy, 69 Ohio St. L. J. 53, 72 (2008); Jill. E. Fisch et al., Passive 
Investors, Penn. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2019). 
67. 2018 Investment Company Fact Book: A Review of Trends and Activities 
in the Investment Company Industry, Inv. Company Inst., no. 58, 2018, 
at 1, https://www.ici.org/pdf/2018_factbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
4ZUA-8PQ2]; see generally Kara Stein, Commissioner, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Address at Brooking’s Institute: Mutual Funds—the Next 75 
Years (June 15, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/mutual-funds-
the-next-75-years-stein.html#_ftnref7 [https://perma.cc/8JKS-69UN. 
68. Leo E. Strine Jr., Vice Chancellor, Del. Court of Chancery, Keynote 
address at the Journal of Corporation Law Spring Banquet: Toward 
Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests 
of Managers and Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate 
Governance (Mar. 1, 2007), in 33 J. Corp. L. 1 (2007).  
69. Annual Letter from Larry Fink, Chairman & Chief Exec. Officer, 
BlackRock, Inc., to Chief Exec. Officers (Mar. 2019), https://www. 
blackrock.com/corporate/en-no/investor-relations/larry-fink-ceo-letter 
[https://perma.cc/VNV4-2CN4]. 
70. See, e.g., The 100 Most Overpaid CEOs 2018: Are Fund Managers Asleep 
at the Wheel?, As You Sow (Mar. 1, 2018), https://www.asyousow. 
org/report/the-100-most-overpaid-ceos-2018/; see generally Am. Fed’n 
of Labor & Cong. of Indus. Org. Office of Inv., AFL-CIO Key 
Votes Survey: How Investment Managers Voted in the 2018 
Proxy Season (2019), https://aflcio.org/reports/afl-cio-key-votes-survey 
[https://perma.cc/X4K9-UJ22]. 
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A better approach would be to enhance disclosure and 
accountability to ultimate investors. Building on the SEC’s 2003 rule 
that required mutual funds to disclose how they voted their proxies,71 
the SEC should establish a new disclosure for how mutual funds 
approach ESG and long-term matters generally, including voting and 
any engagement. Funds dedicated to handling longer-term investments, 
such as college savings or retirement funds, should have to say how 
their approach matches their longer-term mandates.72 
More may also need to be done to align asset managers’ proxy votes 
with the views of their underlying mutual fund investors regarding long-
termism. This could mean eliminating the practice of having 
abstentions count as votes against a resolution.73 Mutual fund investors, 
especially those in generic funds or where little choice exists, could also 
be given the ability to ask their asset manager vote a proportional 
amount of the funds’ proxies along certain ESG lines. 
Ultimately, it is a welcome addition to corporate governance for 
asset managers with substantial shareholder heft to be oriented towards 
long-term-oriented engagement.74 While challenges and questions 
regarding the details exist, this new trend should be encouraged.75 
 
71. Disclosure of Proxy Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by 
Registered Management Investment Companies Rule, 17 C.F.R §§ 239, 
249, 270, 274 (2003). 
72. Leo E. Jr. Strine, Securing Our Nation's Economic Future: A Sensible, 
Nonpartisan Agenda to Increase Long-Term Investment and Job Creation 
in the United States, 71 Bus. Law. 1081, 1108–09 (2016). 
73. See generally Stephen J. Choi et al., The Power of Proxy Advisors, 59 
Emory L.J. 869, 872–74, (2010); Cydney Posner, Activists Seek to 
Exclude Abstentions from the Voting Standard for Shareholder Proposals, 
Cooley (Apr. 1, 2015), https://cooleypubco.com/2015/04/01/activists-
seek-to-exclude-abstentions-from-the-voting-standard-for-shareholder-
proposals/ [https://perma.cc/U5Y3-25NM]; Rachel Curley, Nearly 30,000 
Americans Call for Vanguard to Hold Companies Accountable for Political 
Engagement, Corp. Reform Coalition (Nov. 21, 2017), https:// 
corporatereformcoalition.org/vanguard-petition [https://perma.cc/3BJA-
6GH9]; see Leo E. Strine Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A 
Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and Our Strange 
Corporate Governance System, 126 Yale L.J. 1870, 1966–67 (2017).  
74. See generally Anat R. Admati, A Skeptical View of Financialized 
Corporate Governance, 31 Stan. J. Econ. Persps. 131 (2017). 
75. See, e.g., Dorothy Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 
U. Chi. J. Corp. L., (forthcoming 2018); Fisch et al., supra note 66 at 
31; Eric A. Posner et al., A Proposal to Limit the Anti-Competitive Power 
of Institutional Investors, 81 Antitrust L.J. 669 (2017); José Azar et 
al., Anticompetitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. Fin. 
(forthcoming 2019); Einer Elhauge, New Evidence, Proofs, and Legal 
Theories on Horizontal Shareholding, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. 
Governance & Fin. Reg. (Feb. 14, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard. 
edu/2018/02/14/new-evidence-proofs-and-legal-theories-on-horizontal-
shareholding/ [https://perma.cc/7CHA-W5Q7].  
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Conclusion 
The efficiency and effectiveness of America’s capital markets 
depend upon the quality of information available. Right now, too little 
comparable, reliable ESG information is available for investors to make 
those markets work—which harms investors, workers and communities, 
and ultimately, economic growth. Policymakers should correct the 
market failure in the provision of this information and in doing so better 
align the interests of investors, companies, and the public. ESG 
disclosure is not a panacea; America must still address deep challenges 
of stagnant wages and inequality, climate change and more through a 
wide range of other means. But capital markets should assist, rather 
than hinder, those efforts. 
 
